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1. Several people, including the Swiss Banking Corporation
have in recent times undertaken the task of inquiring whe­
ther the Euro-dollar market contributes to world inflation. This 
activity, of course, presupposes that the theoretical and empi­
rical problem of whether an expansion of the money supply leads 
to inflation has already been solved, in the sense of establish­
ing a positive correlation between increases in the money supply 
and price increases, and of knowing the direction and the para­
meters of that correlation. Granted that this correlation has 
been found theoretically, the problem then becomes one of pro­
ving it empirically, and that involves deciding what particular 
magnitude must be defined as the "world price level". After 
this practical problem has been satisfactorily coped with, it 
is necessary to consider whether Euro-dollar deposits can be 
called "money" and, if that much can be said about them, it 
must be decided what is the relevant aggregate of deposits 
that must be called "Euro-dollar deposits". When that is done, 
the remaining part of the job is to prove that Euro-dollar depo­
sits contribute to world inflation. Finally, it is relevant to 
establish whether Euro-dollar deposits contribute significantly 
to world inflation.
From the above description, it is evident that the task 
to be undertaken is a formidable one. It begins with a theore­
tical problem, the solution of which can be said to have been 
satisfactorily obtained only by people who take a rather cava­
lier approach to economic analysis. A lot of ultra-monetarist
(1) In a Report written for "Prospects", a journal published by 
the Swiss Banking Corooration, and quoted in the International 




























































































statements or, for that matter, of ultra-non-monetarist 
statements, which, respectively, affirm the existence of a 
clear causal link between money supply and price rises, or, 
equally firmly, negate any such link, have had that nature.
What the state of the art warrants, after such a long number 
of years have elapsed since the beginning of the efforts to 
establish a link between these magnitudes, in the form, what 
is more, of a distinct causal relationship is, unfortunately, 
no more than a very weak statement of causality. We cannot 
deny that money supply changes have some effect on price changes, 
but neither can we deny the opposite. Anything stronger than 
that would not be a fair summing up of the present state of 
the art ^  .
Much the same can be said of the international version 
of monetarism, which goes under the name of "monetary approach 
to the balance of payments". While it is necessary to attri­
bute to its proponents the merit of having brought back into 
the focus of analysis the importance of money flows among 
countries, which may affect the balance of payments just as 
much as trade flows, may precede them, may take place in a dir­
ection and according to determinants again not warranted by the 
state of the art; the Monetary Approach has not proved to be an 
alternative approach to balance of payments theory. It has re­
minded us of important phenomena to be included in our analysis, 
which had been largely overlooked by previous theories. But it
(3 )is no substitute for them
(2) See, for all, T. Mayer, The structure of Monetarism.
(3) The monetary theory of the balance of payments may be, 
however, considered historically the first explanation of 
balance of payments dynamics. It was certainly present in the 
writings of Ferdinando Galiani, as F. Cerarano points out in 




























































































In this paper I could not possible begin to explore 
whether there is an important, unidirectional, and measurable 
link between rises in the money supply and price rises. I 
would run into the same difficulties that have beleaguered 
previous attempts in this direction. I propose therefore 
to reduce my task to the more manageable one of considering 
whether Euro-dollar deposits have been or can be a cause of 
inflation of the world money supply. In fact, in its original 
meaning, the word "inflation" described exclusively an increase 
in the supply of money, and not a process of rising prices.
It will then be up to anyone to make up his mind on 
the link between money and prices, once it has been established 
whether the rise of the Euro-dollar market can be counted as a 
cause of inflation of the world money supply.
Although there is no dearth of papers written to prove 
or disprove the connection between the Euro-dollar market and 
price inflation, most of the better quality research has been 
in the last decade or so, directed to prove or falsify the 
existence of a link between the Euro-dollar market and money 
supply inflation. The questions asked, in other words, have 
been: "Do Euro-dollar deposits constitute a new and net addi­
tion to world bank deposits?" and "Is the world money supply 
larger, because of the existence of Euro-dollar deposits, than 
what it would have been in the case there had been no Euro­
dollar deposits?".
(3) cont'd. Political Economy, 8.3.1976. It was reiterated 
after the Ricardian onslaught, by J.S. Mill, Knut Wicksell 
(who got it from H. Thornton) and by the so-called Dutch School. 
About the last, see A. Selden's article, "A critique of Dutch 
Monetarism" in Journal of Monetary Economics, 1975, and the 




























































































It must be affirmed, first of all, that there is 
little theoretical content in this inquiry. It must necess­
arily be largely based on a correct understanding of an insti­
tutional reality which has been the subject of frequent changes, 
and whose main features have remained, for the whole period, 
shrouded in relative obscurity to most economists outside the 
banking world.
What theoretical arguments might precede the institutio­
nal treatment that is most appropriate to deal with Euro-dollar 
problems I am going to go into in a few moments. It is, in fact, 
almost impossible to get started without, first of all, remind­
ing the reader of how the Euro-dollar market came about, in the 
1950's and 1960's.
It will have been noticed by now that I have kept using 
the word "Euro-dollar" as a substitute for the word "Euro-curr­
ency", which other writers have deemed more correct to use. I 
have done so, and I propose to continue to do so in the rest of 
this paper, for the very good reason that the share of other 
"Euro-currencies" does not seem to have increased, from the 
inception of the market to the present day. It has been hover­
ing about 20% of the total Euro-currency market for the last ten 
years, while the Euro-dollars have firmly kept about 80% of this 
very fast-growing market. It will also have been noted, by now, 
that I have been using the expression "Euro-dollar market" as a 
substitute for the expression "international financial market".
I have done so, and am going to do so for the rest of this paper, 
for the very good reason that there does not seem to be (if we 
exclude Eurobonds, which are related to Euro-dollars anyway) any 
other important form of international financial market left to 




























































































nomous from the Euro-dollar market.
2. The Euro-dollar market is the product of the Bretton
Woods system. The international payments system was rebuilt, 
after the second world war, as a fixed exchange rate system, 
where, however, parity changes were permitted but only as a 
result of what the IMF Articles of Agreement defined as 
"fundamental disequilibria". At the insistence of the United 
States, no institution was created to perform the role of 
world central bank (against the better advice of 
J.M. Keynes). As a result, the dollar was, in practice, rati­
fied as world reserve currency and almost sole supplier of 
international liquidity. Again at the insistence of the U.S., 
other very important features of the Keynes and White Plans 
were deleted from what became the final IMF Charter. A vital 
exclusion was that of bilateral capital controls of international 
private short-term capital flows. Both Keynes and White (esp­
ecially the latter) had made it quite clear that the efficient 
working of the international economic system would be put in 
serious jeopardy, after the war, if short-term private capital 
flows were to be allowed back into the system. They had inserted 
into their Plans clauses which compelled the countries receiving 
the flows to reject them, and recycle them back to the countries 
of provenance. This obligation disappeared from the final draft 
and control over short term capital flows became the exclusive 
concern of the countries losing capital (which were, moreover, 
not compelled, but only allowed to control them), thus assuring
the ineffectiveness of any except the most savage unilateral
, . (4)controls
(4) For a more detailed analysis of that period, see M. de Cecco, 
"The Origins of the Post War Payments System", in Cambridge 




























































































The problem of short term capital flows control, 
however, is one of the nastiest ones to beleaguer the manage­
ment of the international economy. In the last decade, for 
instance, we have had a shining example of how uncoordinated 
control of short term capital flows, exercised by both the
(5 )losing and the receiving country, can be extremely deflating
There were other diktats of the American, which gave 
the post-war international monetary system some of the features 
which later induced the growth of the Euro-dollar market. Very 
important to our story was, for instance, United States insist­
ence, in 1948 and 1949, that European currencies be devalued, 
to be able to generate exports from the European economies.
The pressure in this direction was brought to bear especially 
on the U.K. and when the U.K. authorities, who had begun by 
having a completely different outlook on post-war financial 
problems and on the way to solve them, finally gave in and 
devalued Sterling by 30% in November 1949, they were followed 
by 25 other countries, including all the most important ones. 
This wave of devaluations meant that, technology differentials 
not being very large between the U.S. and other industrial 
countries, and wage differentials being, on the other hand, 
quite substantial, the new, post-1949 parity structure induced, 
as the U.S. authorities had hoped, the reconstruction of Euro­
pean economies on an export-led basis. The institutionalization 
of U.S. official foreign aid and the maintenance of the U.S. 
defense budget at wartime levels, the construction and operation
(5) In the early 1970's, the US had established a full panoply 
of controls over capital outflows, and Germany had a similarly 
impressive battery of controls over capital inflows at work. 
This does not seem to have meant more than a systematic dodging 
of the US controls, while the German ones were more forceful. 




























































































of a chain of U.S. military bases overseas, meant that there 
was ample provision of international liquidity in the form of 
dollars throughout the 1950's and 1960's, to accommodate and 
perhaps even foster, the phenomenal growth of international 
trade in the same period.
The growth of world trade consistently exceeded the 
growth of G.N.P. in most countries. Trade, as is known, was 
concentrated among the industrial countries. This meant the 
growth, in those countries, of powerful export lobbies, oppo­
sed to currency up-valuation as an instrument of economic poli­
cy. It also meant that larger and larger shares of G.N.P. would 
come to be transacted in foreign currencies, especially dollars. 
The phenomenal growth of international trade required the use 
of a transaction currency, and only the dollar had the features 
to qualify (after the demise, in 1957, of Sterling as a vehicle 
currency for third parties trade, this predominance of the dollar 
became a virtual monopoly). In each country, as a result, there 
grew up an important section of the business community vitally 
involved in dollar denominated transactions. We must remember 
that, throughout the 1950's, the dollar remained the only truly 
convertible currency and that soon only American banks could 
finance third parties trade in their own currency.
The growing balance of payments deficits, which the U.S. 
began to experience in the late fifties and early sixties, were 
instrumental in establishing the dollar as the sole standard
(5) cont'd. US was pushed away from Germany into the Euro-dollar 
market, from where it probably managed to ultimately penetrate 
the German defenses. Homogeneous and mutually agreed control 
measures must therefore be enforced, if we want to achieve non- 
destablising results. The mere existence of controls at both 
ends is not enough, if there exists a no-man's land, like the 




























































































for the international monetary system. The U.S. authorities 
did not want to even consider a parity change, and the same 
was true of creditor countries. As a result, creditor count­
ries began to accumulate dollar balances, as the U.S. did not 
want to part with its gold. With the obstinate exception of 
France, creditor countries became convinced that the dollar 
was to be considered as being virtually inconvertible into 
gold.
The Euro-dollar market is reputed to have begun in a 
substantial way in 1957, when 3ritish banks were forbidden to 
lend Sterling to finance trade among non-Sterling countries.
In order not to lose a lucrative business they had been involved 
in for decades, British banks began to accept dollar deposits, 
and to lend them to finance international trade. In order to 
attract those deposits they had to give depositors better terms 
and higher interest rates than they would be getting from U.S. 
banks. In so doing, British banks were safe, as American banks 
could not retaliate. They were prevented from doing so by 
Reg. Q of the Federal Reserve System, which forbade the payment 
of interest on deposits of up to 30 days' duration,and placed a 
ceiling on interest rates payable on deposits of more than 30 
days' duration. All that was required, then, was to offer 
dollar depositors a rate higher than the official ceiling to
/ C  \lure them into transferring their deposits to London
(6) The fundamental motivation of American banks opening branches 
in London was to secure deposits from everywhere for loans to 
nearly everywhere. The financial mechanism used by the banks 
has been clearly shown in the law-suit of Bank Melli (Iran) 
against Chase Manhattan Bank: the large deposit of Bank Melli 
was in London, without reserve requirement and regulation Q, 
and whenever the New York balance fell under ten million dollars, 
funds would be transferred by Chase London to Chase New York.




























































































It was very soon perceived that this practice, although 
it momentarily shifted banking business away from American 
banks, was quite a good way of convincing foreigners to keep 
their deposits in dollars, thus stopping the U.S. gold drain. 
Treasury Secretary Dillon expressed exactly this view in a 
Congressional Hearing as early as 1960. And it was just as 
soon evident that among the first to take advantage of the 
new system were minor foreign Central Banks and large multi­
national corporations, i.e. the large holders of dollars who 
had no official commitment to support the dollar but could be 
convinced to hold dollar deposits, albeit in London, if the 
yield on them was reasonable, i.e. above the rates fixed by 
Reg. Q.
The fashion initiated by London banks found numerous 
imitators among European banks and the foreign subsidiaries 
of large American banks. The market began to grow at very 
fast rates after the external convertibility of major Europ­
ean currencies was restored and consolidated, and as the grow­
ing dollar surpluses accumulated by European countries induced 
them to relax controls over the international financial acti­
vities of their citizens and of their banks. It was very soon 
realized that accepting Euro-dollar deposits could be a very
(6) cont'd. to make payments in the U.S. Henry Wallich, in 
"Why the Euromarket needs restraint", Columbia Journal of World 
Business, Fall 1979, estimated that some 52 billion dollars 
abroad should have been considered as part of the U.S. stock 
of money.
There was another important restraint beyond Regulation Q: from 
1933 on, under pressure from the banking lobby, it was prohibited 
to pay interest on demand deposits.
On the origins of the Euro-dollar market a substantial amount 
has been written. See, for a clear treatment and essential ref­





























































































lucrative activity for commercial banks, as, in the practice 
of European and American banking, such deposits were not 
subject to minimum reserve requirements. Banks which entered 
the Euro-dollar business could thus enjoy a substantial 
competitive edge on banks which did not. Being in the Euro­
dollar system also meant that a bank would be well suited 
to answer the increasingly international demands of large 
customers, firms engaged in international trade and multi­
national production.
This was a boon for large banks, both in Europe and 
in the U.S. In the fifties and early sixties they had been 
smarting under the competition coming from savings banks, 
savings and loans associations, insurance companies, which 
were increasingly encroaching upon large bank territory, 
while being tied to considerably lower reserve requirements, 
or to zero reserve requirements. Euro-dollar activity was 
the large banks' answer to this competition, an answer given 
under the benevolent eye of the national monetary authorities.
It is important, moreover, to go briefly into a 
contemporary phenomenon, i.e. the very considerable expansion 
of American banks overseas, which took place in the 1960's.
The growth of American banks' overseas branches is generally 
attributed to a desire to follow their clients, U.S. multi­
national corporations, which were at the same time expanding 
their activities, and to an attempt to stave off European 
banks' competition in the recently created market for dollar 




























































































towards explaining the phenomenal overseas expansion of
U.S. banks, we must add a less often quoted one, which is
(7)in our view equally important . American large banks, 
through overseas expansion, carried on a running battle 
among themselves for a share of the American deposit market, 
a battle which they had initiated in the late fifties. In 
the second half of that decade a great spate of take-overs 
and mergers took place in American banking, which involved 
most of the top American banks of today. The new competi­
tive configuration that emerged as a result, induced a market 
uncertainty over market shares and a new desire to justify 
the mergers through profit maximization. The new mode of 
"liability management" replaced the old one of "asset manage­
ment". The latter had relied on security of market shares 
and risk-minimization. American large banks soon realized 
that a good way to maximize profits and fight for market 
shares was to be found in large scale participation in the 
Euro-dollar market, which was outside the control of bother­
some U.S. monetary authorities. The stampede of U.S. banks 
into London ended up involving even much smaller banks than 
the U.S. majors, but it was the latter who, in the earlv 
sixties, increased their share of the Euro-dollar market 
from a negligible percentage to the rough 50% of total trans­
actions which they were supposed to be responsible for in 1961, 
and which they have managed to hold on to in the following 
years.
The second half of the sixties and the first half of 
the seventies have also witnessed the very rapid growth of
(7) This interpretation is offered in M. de Cecco "International 





























































































even more truly "offshore" money markets, located in the 
Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, the Bahamas, Singapore, etc.
From a very small base these markets have now grown to 
represent about half of total gross Euro-dollar transact­
ions, and they have tended, in the very last years, to 
grow at a much more rapid rate than "traditional" Euro­
market centres. The development of these "truly" offshore 
markets goes hand-in-hand with the attempt, on the part of 
central banks in Europe and the U.S., and in particular the 
Bank of England, to gain some sort of even loose control 
over Euro-dollar transactions, or at least some sort of 
monitoring capacity. It is also a result of the changed 
nature of Euro-dollar transactions, or at least some sort 
of monitoring capacity. It is also a result of the changed 
nature of Euro-dollar depositors, from European and Japanese 
public and private bodies, to oil countries' monetary authori­
ties and private agents. It might not be due to chance that 
most of these new money centres are former British colonies.
3. There is probably a need to differentiate between the
early history of the Euro-dollar market and its development 
in the late sixties and in the seventies. As we have already 
noted, the most important source of Euro-dollars, in the early 
phase of the market, were the Central Banks of creditor count­
ries of Europe and Japan. They were motivated, in putting 
into the Euro-dollar market a part of the dollars which accrued 
to their reserves, by a desire to offset probable losses from 
dollar devaluation through high interest rates (when they acted 




























































































Banks), but especially by a desire to give large banks in 
their own countries a competitive edge over smaller ones 
in the fight for banking market shares that raged in most 
industrial countries throughout the fifties and the sixties, 
and by the hope that a certain amount of "window dressing" 
may be possible, in the sense that by lending dollars to 
their countries' commercial banks, who would re-lend them 
to the Euro-dollar market, official reserves would accord­
ingly decrease (unless the dollar assets of the commercial 
banking system were counted as official reserves, as was not 
the case for quite a considerable time).
In addition, but perhaps sometimes more important 
than all other motives put together, was the Central Banks' 
desire to offset the effects of dollar inflows on the domes­
tic credit suddIv, in an attempt to shy away from the logic 
of the fixed exchange system, which tends to reduce the diff­
erence between individual monetary policies through short-term 
capital movements. In fact, a large part of responsibility 
for the creation, and above all, the rapid growth, of the Euro­
dollar market must be assigned to the desire of Central Banks 
to insulate domestic short-term economic policy, and in parti­
cular monetary policy, from the neutralizing impact of private 
international short-term capital flows. This is indeed the old 
problem, that had induced Keynes, in the 1920's and 1930's, 
first to discover the interest rate parity theorem and then 
to devise a forward exchange intervention policy which might 
insulate domestic interest rate policy from the impact of short­




























































































(together with H.D. White) that a multinational control over 
such flows be inserted into the I.M.F. Charter, as we saw 
earlier. Keynes' advice was, however, lost not only on the 
planners of the postwar monetary system, but also on central 
bankers who, facing similar problems in the sixties as their 
predecessors had faced in the twenties and thirties, attempted 
to solve them by using the Euro-dollar market as the dumping 
ground for undesired official reserves, and refrained from 
developing a forward exchange market with enough depth, width, 
and resiliency to accommodate the very large flows of arbitrage- 
motivated funds. This would not have done anything to solve 
that part of the problem represented by straightforward specu­
lators, but would have probably prevented many international 
traders from turning into occasional currency speculators.
The growth of the Euro-dollar market and its vicissitudes 
have, however, been chiefly affected by the monetary policies 
of two Central Banks, the Federal Reserve and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. With the exception of the increase in oil prices, 
the most remarkable events that have been recorded in the mar­
ket in the last ten years have been due to the often mutually 
incompatible monetary policies initiated and pursued, solely
for domestic purposes, bv the U.S. and the German monetary
.. ... (8 )authorities
(8) On U.S. and German monetary policies in the late sixties 
and early seventies, see McKenzie, l.c. and the literature 
he quotes. Also, on U.S. policy see A. Burger, "Report on 





























































































The very tight credit squeeze enforced by the F.E.D. 
in 1969, for instance, led to what was at that time described 
as the "international interest rates war". For the whole of 
the 1960's, in fact, U.S. large banks had been using the Euro­
dollar market as a source of loanable funds. When Federal 
Funds rates grew over Euro-dollar rates there was an incentive 
for U.S. banks to borrow from the Euro-dollar market, and 
conversely, when the Federal Funds rates went below Euro-dollar 
rates, they had an incentive to lend to the Euro-dollar market. 
Because of Reg. Q., U.S. banks could not - as we saw earlier - 
oav an interest on deposits of less than 30 davs' lenqth.
This did not applv to funds held in the Euro-dollar market.
In addition, under Reg. M., U.S. banks did not have to hold 
any reserves against funds borrowed from foreign banks which 
were not their branches.
All these institutional details became of great rele­
vance in 1969. As the F.E.D. tightened credit, the U.S. banks 
called in reserves from the Euro-dollar market, through their 
foreign branches. At the end of 1969, total liabilities of 
U.S. banks to foreign branches stood at about #13 billion.
As late as 1967 they had been less than #2 billion. This 
huge inflow of funds from the Euro-dollar market into the 
U.S. market was, however, obtained at the cost of a phenomenal 
jump in U.S. (and world) interest rates. Reg. Q ceilings on 
bank deposits of 90 to 179 days were lifted from 4 to 6%.
Prime commercial paper rate rose to 9% in 1969, from 4% in 
1967. Euro-dollar rates could only follow suit, as they in 




























































































perhaps did not have as urqent a need to curb domestic 
demand as the United States.
It is probable that such harsh measures were requi­
red in the U.S. to make monetary policy effective again, 
after several years of unprecedented increases in the U.S. 
money supply. Because of the Vietnam War and of the "Great 
Society" budgetary requirements, the U.S. government was 
compelled to finance its needs by recourse to the printing 
press, as it did not want to impose wartime taxes on its 
citizens (a 10% income surtax was imposed as late as 1968, 
and that was all). The U.S. had been a country of low 
monetary growth since the end of the war, perhaps even 
longer than that. In the mid-sixties this trend was rever­
sed, and the U.S. money supply began to rise at very high 
rates. This new course could not be reversed in 1969. The 
U.S. monetary authorities had still got to meet the demands 
of the government through the printing press. Their monet­
ary policy tried to keep a lot of money flowing while, at 
the same time, lifting nominal interest rates very high.
But, so long as real interest rates remained low or negative, 
because of price expectations, the boom (and inflation) could 
not be curbed. Thus, making money expensive for the private 
sector did not serve its purpose until expectations turned 
around, as they did in 1970. It is debatable, however, 
whether this change in expectations was due to the harsh 
interest rates policy or depended on the decline in military 




























































































The Nixon Administration, which had imposed the 1969 
squeeze, became rather frightened by what it deemed to be its 
results in 1970. The unemployment rate almost doubled in one 
year, from 3.6% in 1969 to 6.2% in 1970. A return to cheaper 
money was therefore considered necessary and, again, was 
abruptly enforced. At the same time, the tax surcharge was 
first reduced to 5%, then abolished altogether in July. In 
June, Reg. Q ceilings on deposits over #100,000 (between 30 
and 90 days) were suspended. This enabled banks to attract 
funds to lend on to their corporate customers, who were feel­
ing a shortage of liquidity, as they found it difficult to 
renew their outstanding commercial paper, because of the crisis 
of confidence engendered by the Penn Central failure. But it 
also meant that the incentive to borrow from the Euro-dollar 
market was reduced. But it was not the only measure the U.S. 
authorities introduced to thwart the successful drive by banks 
to defy the credit squeeze by attracting Euro-dollar funds. In 
1969 Reg. M. was changed, and a 10% reserve requirement was 
introduced on net borrowing of member banks from their foreign 
branches, and on assets acquired by foreign branches from their 
head offices.
While the U.S. authorities embarked upon their refla­
tionary policy, the German authorities, worried by what looked 
to them as unacceptably high price rises, adopted opposite 
measures. The Bundesbank raised both Lombard and discount 
rates, thus opening up a differential with relevant U.S. and 
Euro-dollar rates, which induced arbitrageurs to shift funds 




























































































home by borrowing on the Euro-dollar market. Thus a return 
to easier money in the U.S., accompanied by a tightening of 
rates in Europe and particularly in Germany, and by U.S. 
measures directed towards discouraging U.S. banks from 
borrowing from their branches, gave new impetus to the Euro­
dollar market, and increased the outflow of funds, not only 
from New York into the Euro-dollar market, but also from the 
dollar into the Deutsche Mark.
This brings us to consider a further determinant of
the growth of the Euro-dollar market in the early 1970's :
currency speculation. Currency speculation under the Bretton
Woods system of fixed but sporadically adjustable parities
has been very often described as a game in which Central Banks
played the part of lame ducks. As early as March 1940,
(9)F.D. Graham noted in his splendid A.E.R. article that,
under a system of the gold-standard type, as the direction 
of parity changes could be easily foreseen, speculation was 
a one-way bet for speculators, and central banks had institu­
tionally to play the part of the matching speculator, who was 
absent, whenever the reserves of a speculated-against currency 
fell below a point considered too low by the market's accumu­
lated experience. This game was best played against the autho­
rities as long as parity movements occurred within the limits 
(the intervention points) fixed by the Bretton Woods agreements. 
There would be then no risks to the speculators. But it could 
also be played at a small risk, and with hope of large gains, 
on the eve of discrete parity changes.
(9) F.D. Graham, "Achille's Heels in Monetary Standards", 




























































































It can safely be said that speculators entered the 
scene en force at the time of the great run on Sterling in 
1964. Their numbers increased with the Sterling devalutation 
of November 1967, and went on rising as that event ushered 
in a new era of parity readjustments among major currencies. 
It is reasonable to say that currency speculation reached 
its acme in 1970-71, and was carried on at the same rate for 
a significant while in the new age of greater exchange rate 
flexibility which followed the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in May 1971, when the Deutsche Mark was floated. Spe­
culative activity, as well as arbitrage, was greatly helped 
by the existence of the Euro-dollar market, whose growth in 
turn it fostered. Funds could be "parked" in the Euro-dollar 
market and then shifted into the appropriate currency at the 
appropriate time, or they could be used as the collateral
needed to go short in currencies about to lose relative val-
(10)ue
(10) The massive presence of foreign exchange speculators in 
the Euro-dollar market has been used by Professor Alan Walters 
(A. Walters, "Floating Rates. World Liquidity and Inflation" 
in Euromoney, 9, 1973), as the basis for his suggestive explana­
tion of how the Euro-dollar market served to stoke up the fires 
of price inflation since the demise of the Bretton Woods system. 
Professor Walters' hypothesis is that the last years of the 
Bretton Woods system had witnessed the massive appearance of 
currency speculators, who used the Euro-dollar market as their 
home base; the inception of flexible exchange rates put an 
end to one-way phoney speculation, of the sort we have already 
referred to, and transformed speculation into a high risk acti­
vity, with a 50% chance of being wrong in each speculative trans­
action. Speculators who, according to Walters, were in reality 
strong risk averters at heart,suddenly found themselves with a 
lot of unemployed funds, and began to use them as loans to needy 




























































































After the quantum jump in oil prices, the ensuing 
redistribution of international reserves in favour of oil- 
producing countries meant, first of all, a rather important 
change in the nature of the international adjustment problem. 
Basically, it meant that reserves would be pooled in the hands 
of a few countries which did not possess the economic struct­
ure needed to spend these reserves as quickly as would be 
desirable, in purchases of foreign goods and services. Indus­
trial countries, and non-oil endowed developing countries 
would, as a result, plunge into very wide balance of payments 
deficits, as their oil import bills became huge and the recipi­
ents of the oil related payments did not manage to spend the 
money fast enough.
An initiative similar in kind to the Marshall Plan 
was suggested as the only one capable of coping with the pro­
blem. It could not be expected that the oil producers would 
or even could take that initiative. As a result, the oil funds 
were channelled into the financial centres which the oil produ­
cers had been used to dealing with in the past. At the start, 
that meant New York and, there, no more than a handful of the 
largest world commercial banks, upon which the task fell of 
having to redistribute those deposits to other banks and to 
final borrowers, which often meant going through the Euro-dollar
(10) cont'd. This greatly increased the pressure on world 
resources, as countries found it easy to carry on with their 
inflationary policies, financing their deficits in the Euro­
dollar market, and Euro-dollar banks got more and more involved 
in credit transformation. Hence the jump in world inflation 
rates in 1972 and 1973. The suggestive Walters hypothesis, which 
we have just summarized, and will not be able to either prove or 
falsify, leads us to the most recent phase the Euro-dollar mar­




























































































market. It also meant a considerable widening of the gap 
between lending and borrowing terms in the international 
accounts which had, because of the oil crisis, become structu­
rally imbalanced, and therefore required medium to long-term 
financing.
The Euro-dollar market (and particularly its prime 
banking names) was thus resorted to, for the transformation 
of these short-term deposits into medium and long-term loans, 
in the absence of any concrete inter-governmental initiative.
It was onlv a matter of months before the markets beaan to 
reel under the impact of this huge responsibility. A pallia­
tive solution to this problem of private undertaking of 
"sovereign" risk, was found first of all in adopting a risk­
sharing mechanism well know to the international insurance 
business: when a loan to a government or to a public institu­
tion, or to a large private corporation is floated, it is 
finally taken up by a very wide number of banks, who only take 
a small amount each of the loan. The terms of the loan are, 
however, negotiated with the borrower by a few of the partici­
pating banks, who perform the role of "leaders", take up large 
chunks of the loan, and guarantee with their names the quality 
of the risk undertaken. This solution, however, although it 
reduces the chances of insolvency for the individual banks, 
does not reduce the chances of insolvency for the whole market. 
It also enhances the possibility that "lead" banks become 
specialists in single risks and thus get locked up in case 




























































































with the Argentine "cedulas" in the 1890's) . After a
few rather dramatic and well advertised bank failures in 
late 1974, which made the oroblem evident to national authori­
ties, the illiquidity problem has been to a certain extent 
met by an understanding among Central Banks, reached on Sept­
ember 10, 1974, at the Bank for International Settlements. 
According to it, the Central Banks of the Group of Ten agreed 
that the Central Bank of the country where foreign branches 
of banks were domiciled would act as lender of the last resort 
in case of need. This, of course, meant that the Bank of 
England had agreed to act in that capacity, having probably 
secured the support of "Group of Ten" Central Banks, in the 
case of a serious liquidity crisis. This agreement, however, 
does not cover that part of the Euro-dollar market which is 
domiciled in the more truly off-shore money centres and which 
has lately become the most dynamic. It is not known what major 
Central Banks would do in case a serious insolvency crisis 
erupted in one of these centres. While it is almost certain 
that in the end they would come to the rescue, some doubts can
be harboured about the timing and the organization of the
.. (12) rescue operation
(11) These considerations are made in M. de Cecco, "New Dimen­
sions for International Lending" in The World Today, 1974. The 
comparison of Euro-dollar loans underwriting methods to those 
used in the insurance market is also made by Robert Heller, in 
the evidence he submitted on the Euro-Currency Control Act of 
1979 to the House of Representatives Committee on Banking, Fin­
ance and Urban Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, Serial 
n. 96-23, Washington, 1979. Heller, however, does not seem to 
avert the danger that these sorts of arguments represent.
(12) This paper having been written before the "Ambrosiano affair" 





























































































It is to be noted, however, that more than 50% of 
total Euro-dollar transactions seemed to be performed, as 
late as 1975, by the foreign branches of American banks.
This is a good reason to believe that the F.E.D., if it 
decides to do so, is still in a position to come to the 
rescue in most cases. And this opinion is corroborated 
by events, like the default of Zaire and the difficulties 
of Peru, two cases where major U.S. banks found themselves 
locked in and were helped by the F.E.D.
In the more recent phase, the Euro-dollar market 
banks also tried to solve the problem of sovereign risk 
by adopting the I.M.F. as their unofficial leader in large 
financial transactions with sovereign borrowers. The I.M.F. 
does not command the funds necessary for these transactions, 
but it has a well proven (and, to some observers, sometimes 
perverse) mechanism to assess the credit-worthiness of coun­
tries, and to recommend the terms at which money will be lent, 
i.e. the economic policies the borrowers will undertake to 
adopt in order to correct their imbalances. A lot of articles 
have been written to criticise the procedures the I.M.F. adopts, 
and the so-called "Polak recipe" it prescribes to borrowers, 
which consists in most cases of the indication of a certain
rate of total domestic credit expansion, coupled with deval-
(13)uation to release output for exports and reduce imports
(13) Although it has been attributed to the theoretical arti­
culation of J.J. Polak, who was for many years head of the 
I.M.F.'s research department, the "Polak recipe" was developed, 
at the end of the first world war, as a series of conditions 
which would accompany loans to shore up the currencies of the 
Hapsburg succession states (Austria, Hungary, Poland). The 




























































































In spite of these criticisms, and of the additional one, 
that the I.M.F. seems capable of imposing its cure only on 
small countries, the Euro-dollar banks seem to have chosen 
the I.M.F. as their "international auditors", so that they 
will feel more comfortable when lending to a country after 
the I.M.F. has vetted it and has made it accept an I.M.F. 
loan on conditions agreed with the I.M.F. The periodic 
reviews of the situation which the I.M.F. also imposes on 
its borrowers serve as guiding lights to the Euro-dollar 
market for its own behaviour towards the same borrowers ^
If we want to sum up the reasons behind the growth 
of the Euro-dollar market in the last two decades, we have 
to recall all the benefits accruing from its existence to 
all interested parties:
1) The U.S. was able to persuade foreigners to hold 
dollars, albeit outside the U.S., because Euro-banks could 
pay interest rates higher than those given by banks in the 
U. S . ;
(13) cont'd. and bureaucrats like Norman, Niemeyer, Salter, 
and were based on the firm belief that Budget Deficits deter­
mined inflation and exchange rate depreciation. Bresciani- 
Turroni graphically described this doctrine as the "Inter-
Ally view", its opponents advanced the view that it was exchange 
depreciation which bred inflation and budget deficits, thus 
determining a "vicious circle". I have analysed these doc­
trines, and their modern resuscitation in "Vicious and virtuous 
circles, the debate in the twenties and in the seventies", a 
paper presented to the Second Workshop on the German Hyper­
inflation, held at Berkeley in July 1982, and which will be 
published in the Proceedinas of the Workshop.
(14) Indeed, a large majority of direct I.M.F. loans now go to 
the developing countries, and particularly to those that seem 
too poor to get unconditional bank credits. This trend was 
recently quantified and reviewed with some concern bv Rimmer




























































































2) Euro-banks could offer higher rates on deposits 
because they were not tied to compulsory reserve ratios on 
those deposits and because they paid no corporation tax on 
offshore business;
3) Non-American monetary authorities could dump un­
wanted dollars, directly or via their commercial banks, into 
the Euro-dollar market, thus avoiding, to some extent, revalua­
tion and inflation;
4) Large corporations could use the Euro-dollar market 
to place their short-term cash most suitably, and later on,
to be able to switch from one currency to another, and to 
hedge themselves against possible exchange fluctuations 
(especially in view of the poor and limited forward cover 
facilities available);
5) British banks could continue their traditional 
international business, when Sterling began to be phased 
out as an international transaction currency;
6) The monetary authorities of deficit countries could 
refurbish their reserves in the Euro-dollar market, thus post­
poning for some time embarrassing applications for I.M.F. 
assistance;
7) Large commercial banks were allowed, by specialising 
in Euro-dollar business, to offset the losses of deposits to 
other banks and financial intermediaries which were, for a time, 
eroding their market share, in most Western banking systems.
Had the Euro-dollar market not offered so many advant­
ages to so many different types of institutions, it would not 




























































































Central Banks must have certainly considered it a useful set­
up; otherwise, they could have let it starve to death in 1969, 
when the U.S. banks pumped funds from it back to the U.S. mar­
ket. On the contrary, they fed it very generously on that occa­
sion. Nor did they try to get their funds back in 1970, when 
the U.S. economy stopped absorbing them. Again, Japanese mone­
tary authorities, in spite of the Central Banks' 1971 agreement 
not to feed the Euro-dollar market, found it convenient to dump 
a large part of their dollar holdings there. As a result of 
these two episodes, the market acquired its mammoth size in 
the 1970's, and the similar behaviour of oil countries' mone­
tary authorities has kept it growing at an at least eguallv 
fast rate since 1973.
4. Attempts to analyse the Euro-dollar market's contribu­
tion to money supply inflation have proceeded along the well- 
trodden paths of monetary theory. The potential the market 
has for credit creation has, therefore, been scrutinized by 
using ex post multipliers a la Friedman. Alternatively, a 
"new view", based on Tobin's portfolio selection has been 
advanced and, lately, a "net liquidity" approach on the lines 
of Hicks' famous contribution has been suggested.
It was Milton Friedman himself who proposed, for the 
study of Euro-dollar credit creation a perfect analogue of 
a closed banking system, fed by an exogenously determined 
high-powered money . In his opinion, the magic of the
(15) See his "The Euro-dollar market: some first principles", 




























































































book-keeper's pen is at work in the Euro-dollar market, 
just as it is in the American commercial banking system, 
or in any fractional reserve banking system. However,
Friedman inserted into his "simile" a very important quali­
fication. He compared the Euro-dollar market to a part of 
the domestic banking system, as in the case of "Chicago banks" 
and contrasted it with a system of non-bank financial inter­
mediaries. It is my opinion that all Friedman wanted to point 
out was the fact that the Euro-dollar market was part of the 
American banking system, and that the F.E.D. was responsbile 
for its growth, and that he was only marginally interested in 
showing the credit-creating potential of the system. But his 
message was read by most to mean that Euro-dollar deposits 
could multiply ad infinitum and, quite contrary to Friedman's 
intentions, that the Euro-dollar market was a no-man's land, 
where money could grow at a rate not controlled by any Central 
B ank.
Accordingly, in order to disprove Friedman's analysis, 
the objections used by Tobin in his polemic with Friedman were 
wheeled out again. It was noted, first of all, that the prop­
ortion of deposits Euro-banks held as reserves is likely to be 
small. Fred Klopstock in asserting that, suggested that
a large part of Euro-deposits are not demand deposits and that 
even in the case of demand deposits, reserves can be borrowed 
by Euro-banks in case these deposits are withdrawn, just by 
converting non-dollar assets or by borrowing dollars from Ameri­
can correspondent banks or head offices.
(16) F.H. Klopstock, "Money Creation in the Eurodollar Market", 




























































































This line of argument, however, would play into 
Friedman's hands, as it would reveal the existence in the 
Euro-dollar market of a large potential for deposit multi­
plication. Klopstock was therefore quick to add that there 
was no reason to take the Euro-dollar market as a closed 
banking system. Only a small proportion of the funds created 
by Euro-dollar banks would, in fact, return to the Euro-dollar 
banks. A lot would be deposited in America, thus acting as 
a de-multiplier of Euro-dollar deposits, and some more would 
be converted into the currency of the receivers of Euro-dollar 
loans, thus halting the multiplication process.
Both these arguments, however, can be put to the oppo­
site use. If a Euro-dollar deposit is transformed into an 
American dollar deposit there is de-multiplication, but this 
can only point to a danger inherent in the Euro-dollar system, 
the possibility it lends U.S. monetary authorities to dis-inter- 
mediate Euro-dollar banks, only 50% of which are U.S. banks.
Even more relevant is the second of Klopstock's arguments.
If a Euro-dollar borrower converts his loan into his home 
currency, his country's Central Bank must refrain from putting 
the newly acquired dollar deposit back into the Euro-dollar 
market. Only in that case will the multiplication process 
come to a halt. We have seen in the previous pages, however, 
how Central Banks, first the European, then the Japanese, then 
the oil countries', and all the time those of minor European 
and underdeveloped countries, were never all at the same time 
abiding by that rule, which Klopstock requires to belittle the 
multiplicative potential of the Euro-dollar market. They were, 
in Klopstock's opinion, the main sources of the Euro-dollar 




























































































intention to demonstrate that it was foreign Central Banks 
and not, as surmised by Friedman, the American F.E.D., that 
had been responsible, with their behaviour, for the Euro­
dollar market's growth.
It is thus fair to say that the Euro-dollar market 
can be capable of very remarkable deoosit multiDlication, 
but that the multiplier is, nevertheless, very unstable. It 
depends on the behaviour of many Central Banks and on that of 
the borrowers. We must convince ourselves, however, that 
having proved that the Euro-dollar multiplier is unstable 
we have discovered a very unpleasant phenomenon. Imagine 
a credit market which is, to various degrees, controlled bv 
several, rather than by just one, monetary authorities, all 
quite independently motivated, and one of which is a good deal 
more powerful than the others. The potential for market insta­
bility and for credit multiplication depends on the convergence 
or divergence of the behaviour of these authorities. If the 
F.E.D. expands its supply of high-powered money, a part of it 
will flow to the Euro-dollar market. There the potential for 
multiplication will depend on other Central Banks' behaviour.
If they return the dollar deposits that get into their reserves 
to the Euro-dollar market, the multiplier will, other things 
being equal, be very-large. If few Central Banks will let 
the dollars stay in their reserves, and only some will return 
them to the market, the multiplier will be smaller. On the 
other hand, if the F.E.D. decides to squeeze its supply of 
high-powered money, dollars will tend to return to the U.S. 
and the Euro-dollar market will starve, unless the non-U.S. 




























































































reserves of dollars, so that high-powered money will come 
to the Euro-dollar market from non-U.S. official sources.
The size of the Euro-dollar market might in this case even 
remain unchanged. This is a much more important source 
than an increase in the velocity of circulation of dollars 
not owned by Central Banks, or than a decrease in the Euro­
banks' precautionary reserve levels. Of course, if the U.S. 
is set on a savage squeeze, a time will come when all dollar 
reserves of all non-U.S. Central Banks will be exhausted.
That time, however, is certainly very far off, and an unthink­
ably grave squeeze in the U.S. would therefore be needed to 
starve the Euro-dollar market in spite of the will of non-U.S. 
Central Banks to keep it alive. The F.E.D. may even be less 
capable of enforcing such a policy vis-à-vis the Euro-dollar 
market if we make a further assumption: if we assume that a 
lot of depositors, in the Euro-dollar market, are multinatio­
nal corporations, which use the Euro-banks for payments to 
one another, then the analogue of a closed banking system 
acquires greater credibility. We all know this assumption 
is rather excessive, but it might come much less wide of the 
mark as years go by, the internationalization of production
goes on, and the grip of multinationals on world exports
(17)becomes firmer than it already is
(17) In the House Hearings we quoted above, Robert Heller 
indicated that the Euro-dollar market was to be considered 
as a "demand" rather than a "supply" determined market, since 
the Federal Reserve could not determine the supply of Euro­
dollars. He notices, but did not stress, the arguments about 
Central Bank oligopoly we advance here. Quite opposite views 
on the subject are, on the other hand, expressed by Ronald 
McKinnon in "Currency Substitution and Instability in the 
World Dollar Standard" in American Economic Review, June,
1982, where he stresses the possibility that the major world 
Central Banks, by acting as a non-collusive oligopoly, determine 




























































































We have, thus far, dealt only with the "new view" 
objections to the stability of the banking multiplier. But 
if the Euro-dollar multiplier is unstable the fact that it is 
not very predictable is certainly not very good news to us.
We are not using it to predict the impact of changes in the 
money supply on price changes; we are only trying to become 
aware of the dangers inherent in an unstable credit system, 
controlled by an often non-collusive oligopoly of Central 
Banks. The latter's behaviour can lead the market to very 
rapid expansion or equally rapid depression. In reality, 
we have seen that the first instance has been realized much 
more than the second one, as non-American Central Banks 
have colluded to offset the restrictive behaviour of the 
F.E.D., and have also colluded to allow the expansive beha­
viour of the F.E.D. to have its full effects on the Euro­
dollar market.
The Euro-dollar market, however, is not only a market 
controlled by an oligopoly of Central Banks, it is also a 
market where a rather small number of very large commercial 
banks control a large share of total transactions. The 
small numbers, and large relative shares, of the banks 
involved, make it possible for the market as a whole to 
undergo very deep oscillations, due, for instance, to the 
troubles a few of the protagonists may be having, or to 
oligopolistic warfare among groups of protagonists. The 
multiplier may oscillate according to the phases of these 
fights.
(17) cont'd. huge flows of funds between major currencies, 
thus inflating and deflating the world money supply. It is 
much the same reasoning as we develop here, but McKinnon 




























































































If we observe the actual development of the Euro-dollar
market, we might come to the conclusion that, in this case,
Tobin's objections to the uniqueness of the banking multiplier
are more justified than in the case of a closed banking sys-
(18)tem . Other financial intermediaries, in a closed system,
cannot, in most cases, hold their reserves in any other form 
than bank deposits, thus not being able to put a stop to bank 
credit expansion. In the case of the Euro-dollar market, how­
ever, if non-U.S. Central Banks do not feed back the dollars 
they receive, the Euro-dollar multiplication potential is very 
substantially reduced. There can be, unlike the case of a 
closed system, real leakages.
It should be noted that, in order for Tobin's view to 
hold, there should be an only partial commercial banks' mono­
poly of money creation. If bank deposits are almost univers­
ally used as money, Tobin's objections meet with difficulties. 
But if we live in a world where coin, State Notes, and bank 
deposits coexist as means of payment, Tobin's objections to 
the banking multiplier are theoretically reasonable. Non-bank 
financial intermediaries can then receive the savers' money 
and keep it in safes or elsewhere, or lend it to people who only 
partly transform it into bank deposits. Then, relative yields 
will be very important in influencing liquidity preference, and 
the banking multiplier can be highly unstable.
Now, it seems to me that the Euro-dollar market can 
be fruitfully likened to such a monetary system. Dollars 
can be held by non-Americans at banks in the U.S., and else­
where, depending on interest rates. Dollars held elsewhere
(18) See J. Tobin "Commercial Banks as Creators of Money" in 




























































































can be borrowed by people who can transform them into other 
currencies. Central Banks will receive these dollars and 
have to make up their minds whether to keep them off or put 
them back into the Euro-dollar market. Also, dollars held 
by foreigners outside the U.S. can be lent by Euro-dollar 
banks to borrowers who will bring them back to the U.S.
Interest rates, exchange rates, and expectations 
on both, enter the stage as soon as Euro-dollars come into 
existence. We saw very early on how the market could not 
have got started without the existence of interest rate 
differentials. Expected parity changes in the major curr­
encies were responsible for just as large a part of the in­
crease in its size.
The fact, however, that the "new view" may be more 
relevant to the Euro-dollar market than the "old view" does 
not mean that we shall get much further if we try to be 
eclectic and estimate the Euro-dollar market's potential 
for credit multiplication just by inserting interest diff­
erentials into a traditional multiplier. This was done by
(19)A. Swoboda , but in order to get a manageable formula,
he had to sacrifice a lot of the options the actual Euro­
dollar market offers. The value of his results was thus 
reduced by the simplifications, as G.W. McKenzie has aptly 
pointed out. Swoboda assumed that the number of banks 
involved in passing to each other a fraction of an initial 
Euro-dollar deposit was fixed. But this is not necessarily 
true. Furthermore, he assumed that the fraction re-deposited





























































































by banks with other Euro-banks was fixed; and this again 
is a variable, dependina on each bank's liquidity preference 
at any time. Lastly, he assumed that the fraction re-deposi­
ted by non-bank borrowers was fixed, and that, as well, is a 
variable, depending upon the portfolio preferences of each 
depositor at any time.
More recently Hewson and Sakakibara have improved
upon Swoboda's earlier effort, and produced a model of the 
Euro-dollar market which tries to take into account the port­
folio behaviour of borrowers and lenders of Euro-dollars. 
However, they assume that domestic interest rates in countries 
that "border" on the Euro-dollar market are fixed, and that 
there is no conversion of assets from dollars into other 
currencies.
The most recent contribution in this field comes from 
M. Villani, an economist with the Banca d'Italia. In an 
unpublished paper, he sets out to provide a model of the Euro­
dollar market which may take stock of the important.institu­
tional changes the market has undergone since the oil crisis 
and that may be based on the Hicksian concept of net liquidi­
ty.
Mr. Villani correctly notes that a large part of the 
Euro-dollar market has come to be composed, in the years since 
the oil shock, of deposits by oil producers, which have as 
their main feature their very short life span, and of variable 
interest rate, medium-term, loans to deficit countries. This
(20) J. Hewson and E. Sakakibara, "The Eurodollar Multiplier, 




























































































is an important change from what happened in the same market 
before oil producers became the main depositors and deficit 
countries the most important borrowers. Euro-dollar banks 
have had the task of transforming these liquid deposits into 
less and less liquid loans.
The approach taken by Villani to the problem is
very similar to that taken by Hewson and Niehans in a joint
(21)article . They begin from Hewson's realization, con­
tained in an earlier contribution, that the essence of the 
problem of the Euro-dollar multiplicative mechanism is very 
similar to what makes the difference between banks and other 
financial intermediaries, a source of heated debate in the 
1950's and 1960's among Friedman, Gurley and Shaw, Tobin, 
and others. Hewson and Niehans then proceed to formalise 
their acceptance of the Gurley and Shaw approach, which is 
itself a formalisation of the Hicksian "Suggestion for 
simplifying the theory of money". The core of that approach, 
however, is the description of a financial system whose main 
feature is "inside" rather than "outside" money, i.e. money 
which is somebody's debt and somebody else's credit. As is 
known, this is an approach Harry Johnson attributed to Keynes 
as well, and its crucial assumption is that the debtor's borr­
owing capacity is diminished by each sum he borrows. Now, this 
is certainly not a valid assumption to make when dealing with 
present day financial systems, where the arch-borrower, the 
State, is in no way (until the extremes of inflation have 
been reached), deterred from further borrowing by the out­
standing stock of his previous borrowing. In fact, if the
(21) J. Hewson and J. Niehans, "The Eurodollar Market and Mone­




























































































State authorities realise that, by spending the money 
borrowed, they contribute to raise the general price 
level, they might very well step up their borrowing 
and expenditure, in order to raise prices and thus de­
crease the real value of the stock of government debt. 
Because of this generalised fact of life, it has been 
suggested by Friedman and others that an "outside" money 
assumption is preferable, when dealing with actual modern 
monetary systems.
Obviously, this is a rather heavy limitation, that 
Hewson and Niehans, and Villani with them, must face, to 
the euristic value of their analytical findings. When 
dealing with the Euro-dollar market we cannot forget one 
of the definitional truths of a Gold-Exchange Standard, 
as the one which prevailed since the war undoubtedly was: 
that the country providing the standard was free from 
balance of payments problems exactly because all other 
countries accepted its money as international liquidity. 
And this basic rule seems to have been quite closely 
respected by the U.S. and the other countries. The fact 
that all others had to accept dollars in their reserves 
no matter at what rate the U.S. determined to put them 
into the market is exactly, as we saw earlier, one of 
the causes of the rise of the Euro-dollar market. The 
rise of the Euro-dollar market can be seen as an attempt 
to have a cake and eat it, but we cannot infer that the 
postwar international monetary system can be depicted as 




























































































Having made clear this rather important short­
coming of models of the Euro-dollar market based on 
"inside" money assumptions, we can then proceed to see 
how, by using a "net liquidity" concept, in opposition 
to the one of "gross liquidity" used by Hewson and Niehans, 
Villani comes to the conclusion that the Euro-dollar mar­
ket has not functioned solely as a distributor of liquidi­
ty, as Hewson and Niehans suggested, but rather as a source 
of net liquidity to the world economic system.
It should be clear by now that we ought to nurture 
a healthy disrespect for these attempts to quantify the 
multiplicative potential and the actual credit creation 
of the Euro-dollar market. This scepticism should not 
involve the analytical efforts that have yielded the 
quantitative results we question, for they command our 
respect. But we must not refrain from noting that, acc­
ording to which of the studies we believe, the Euro-dollar 
multiplier can have a value lower than one or much above 
one. It should therefore be advisable to use these studies 
for the insight they offer into the problem, rather than 
for the quantitative solutions they provide.
There is, however, a side to the problem which
22)seems to have been overlooked in the literature . The 
Euro-dollar market, in all its almost twenty years of life, 
has represented a steady and marked re-privatization of the
(22) Among the very few people who have considered this 
point we can count Governor Henry C. Wallich, in his State­
ment before the Committees on Domestic Monetary Policy and on 
International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House 




























































































international financial system, and of international 
capital flows, which had been subjected to heavy controls 
in the previous twenty years. Even the behaviour of 
Central Banks, when they operate in this market, is very 
similar to that of private actors. But, in parallel with 
this re-privatization, a very impressive internationali­
zation of production has occurred, which has involved 
the very largest corporations. It is probable that, as 
a result of the latter phenomenon, a very important share 
of world trade is now effected by multinationals, and also 
that the degree of concentration in world production and 
sales has increased. If this is the case, the ability to 
control prices, on the part of the producing firms, has 
increased accordingly.
It is not too far fetched to think that the Euro­
banks have come to cater to the financial needs of multi­
national corporations, and that this is an important part 
of their total activities. If the Euro-dollar market is 
capable, as it seems, even only of substituting itself to 
a large, and growing, share of domestic credit markets, 
the fact that Euro-banks tend to accomodate preferably 
very large non-financial corporations means that these 
corporations have found in the Euro-dollar market a source 
of credit larger perhaps than what they would have at 
their disposal in the case where the Euro-dollar market 
did not exist, but certainly not affected by domestic 
credit controls. In other words, if this is true, the 




























































































from the small to the large corporations and it has enabled 
the latter to ride over great domestic credit squeezes with 
only negligible effects to their actual borrowing levels. 
Credit squeezes, as a result, have come to affect, even 
more than before, small business exclusively, while big 
business has been put in a position to ignore them.
Permanent credit availability, as that offered by
the Euro-dollar market, has allowed large corporations to
expand free from financial fetters, thus escaping from the
clutches of the stop-go policies that have characterized
(23)most western domestic credit markets in this period
Moreover, as it is known that one of the main feat­
ures of the Euro-dollar market is the low spread between 
deposit and lending rates, Euro-dollar customers usually 
get better terms than they would in the domestic credit 
markets. Therefore, we may say that the growth of the Euro 
dollar market has redistributed world credit in favour of 
that part of the business community which is in a position 
to control (and raise) prices, and has also given them a 
further edge on similar companies. It has thus encouraged 
the drive towards concentration and non-competitive control 
over the price mechanism.
(23) Indeed, this structural transformation of the credit 
markets which the Euro-dollar system permitted has been 
used by Albert Vojnilover as the basis for his supply- 
determined interpretation of postwar U.S. financial history 
which he developed in his " Central Role of Credit Crunches 
in Recent U.S. Institutional History", Brookings Papers in 




























































































This is probably as important a consideration as 
any that are made on the role of the Euro-dollar market.
The redistributive role played by the Euro-dollar market, 
in fact, might have accelerated the source of world inflation 
more than any mechanism more closely related to monetarist 
explanations of the inflationary process. However, in this 
case, just as in those previously considered, we cannot 
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